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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
On the facts of the principal case, relief would have been afforded in
"enlightened" Sales Act states and in UCC states. In this area there appears
to be a common thread or jurisprudential theme running through the modern
decisions, whether under the common law, USA, or UCC. Many reasons
such as public policy, public interest, difficulty of proving negligence, etc.,
are given to sustain liability for breach of warranty in the absence of privity,
whereas, in reality, "fairness" seems to be the underlying conception. Ulti-
mate consumers are entitled to maximum protection from defective products,
and the party usually best able to absorb the risk of loss and insurance
coverage is the manufacturer or producer through cost diversification. In
order to obtain equitable results many courts are forced to adopt fictions
such as that "warranties run with the goods" or that "consumers are third
party beneficiaries." Perhaps such rationalizations are necessary in juris-
dictions which impose liability upon a manufacturer only in a tort action,
since allegations of negligence are difficult to prove even by invoking res
ipsa loquitur. Regardless of the reasons which a particular court uses to
establish liability, it is submitted that in the interests of fairness and neces-
sity, a wider class of persons than purchasers should be afforded protection
from defective products. The Uniform Commercial Code has made a positive
step in the right direction.
BRUCE N. SACHAR
Bankruptcy—Summary Jurisdiction—Rights of Transferees—Kohn
v. Myers & Teleprompter Corp. 1—Subsequent to the filing of a final
amended petition, but prior to the final bankruptcy adjudication, a com-
petitor and his attorney purchased from the bankrupt certain of his accounts
receivable. Thereafter the plaintiff, the trustee in bankruptcy, sought to set
aside the transfers under § 70d(1) and (5) of the Bankruptcy Act? The
referee in bankruptcy having decided that the bankruptcy court had sum-
mary jurisdiction of the controversy, issued an order requiring the defend-
ants to turn over all monies collected from the accounts receivable and to
reassign to the trustee the uncollected accounts. Upon the defendants'
petition for review, the district court affirmed the referee's order both as to
summary jurisdiction and the propriety of the turnover order.8
On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that all the assets in the actual or constructive ownership of the bankrupt
at the filing of the initial petition are subject to summary jurisdiction.'
Also the defendants did not come under the statutory exception which
permits one having a reasonable belief that the petition is not well founded
to deal with the bankrupt.
1 266 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1959).
2 Bankruptcy Act § 70d, 52 Stat. 879 as amended, II
	 § 110d (1958).
3 In The Matter of Autocue Sales and Distributing Corp., 162 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
4 The court summarily dismissed this point on page 355 of the opinion.
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The court's decision upholding the exercise of summary jurisdiction by
the bankruptcy court in situations involving litigation concerning property
in the actual or constructive possession of the bankrupt at the time the
petition is filed, is well founded.° The filing of the petition brings all the
assets in the hands of the bankrupt within the custody of the court. If the
question of possession at the date of bankruptcy is raised then a property
claimant may be entitled, in limited situations, to have his interest adjudi-
cated in a plenary suit .° The bankrupt, being the legal owner of the
choses-in-action up to the time of the filing of the petition, had sufficient
possession to support the district court's summary jurisdiction.?
The more important aspect of the case was the court's interpretation
of § 70d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act.° The defendants were not protected
under § 70d(1) even though they had paid fair consideration for the choses-
in-action, because they had knowledge of the pending petition.° However
under § 70d(3) a transferee having actual knowledge of a pending petition
is protected when he has "reasonable cause" for believing that the petition
is unsound.1° This case is the first that has been found where a court has
been expressly called upon to judicially interpret this section. In holding
that merely because the involuntary petition was twice amended the trans-
ferees did not have reasonable cause for believing it to be unsound, the
court accepted the belief expressed by commentators that this statutory
exception would apply only in unusual circumstances."
By its decision the court has prevented the utilization of § 70d(3) as an
instrument to circumvent the protection given to the bankrupt estate. Unless
the exception was sharply limited it could easily be manipulated to drain
the assets from the bankrupt and thereby prevent the trustee from advan-
tageously disposing of the bankrupt's property. The result of the court's
holding that the policy of the statute places a rigid and absolute ban on all
transfers made after the filing of the initial petition but prior to the final
adjudication, and also that under the statutory exception the transferee must
sustain the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of his belief that the
a Inter-State Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955);
Solomon v. Allied Building Credits, Inc., 209 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955); Bradley v.
St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1951).
6 See MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 206 (1956). Collier, Bankruptcy Manual if 70.34
(2d ed. Edelman 1954).
7 In Re Worrell 79 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1935); In Re Borok 50 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1931),
8 See note 2 supra.
9 The opinion made it clear that if transfers for a fair equivalent value were
permitted after the filing of the initial petition the protection offered by the statute
would be nullified. Also by way of dictum the court summarily dismissed any potential
arguments that the transfer was valid because there was no fraud or because the
bankrupt's estate had actually benefited from the transaction.
10 In its opinion the court interpreted § 70d(3) as raising a "conclusive presump-
tion or substantive rule of law" that the acquisition of the bankrupt's assets after a peti-
tion in bankruptcy is not in good faith if the transferee had knowledge of the pending
petition and did not have reasonable cause to believe that it was not well founded.
11 Collier, Bankruptcy Manual If 70.34 (2d ed. Edelman 1954).
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petition is unsound cannot be questioned. Thus the interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Act requiring an objectively substantial basis for application
seems appropriate to further the protection provided by the Act.
ANTHONY R. DIPIETRO
Banks—Holder for Value—Collection Agreement.—Pike v. First Nat'l
Bank. 1—The plaintiff collecting bank sued the drawer on two checks total-
ing $2,300.00, drawn in payment of two automobiles sold to the drawer.
The payee, Auto Auction, endorsed the checks to J. C. Andrews Motor Co.,
from whom the cars had been received for sale. Andrews in turn endorsed
them "for deposit only" and deposited them to his account with the plaintiff
bank. Subsequently on the day of deposit, he drew against his account
leaving a balance of only $66.44 therein. Five days later defendant drawer,
learning of an outstanding lien against the automobiles, effectively stopped
payment on the checks. In the lower court, a verdict was directed in favor
of the bank, and the drawer appealed. The Court of Appeals of Georgia
affirmed, holding: regardless of whether initially an express deposit agree-
ment between depositor and the collecting bank created merely a principal
agent relation, where the depositor, pursuant to the bank's custom, with-
drew substantially the entire proceeds of deposited checks prior to collection
and before notice of their infirmity, the hank thereby gave value and be-
came a holder in due course as to the amount withdrawn with the right to
enforce payment against the drawer.
The question presented by this case was whether the collecting bank
was a holder2
 for value with respect to the checks or only a collection agent
for the depositor, in the course of which relation it merely loaned its de-
pcsitor the value of the checks. If the bank were the latter, any defense of
the drawer, such as failure of consideration as in this case, good against the
depositor could be successfully urged in a suit brought by the depositor's
agent, the collecting bank.4 As a holder for value, however, the bank would
be free from defenses that would be available to the prior parties among
themselves . 5
It is generally held that a check deposited merely for collection does
not transfer title, for the collecting bank undertakes to act only as an agent
for collection and not as a purchasers Even when the check is credited to
the account of the depositor, but there is no right of withdrawal nor is any
money advanced, most American courts hold that the check is still presumed
to have been deposited for collection only, and the credit made in anticipa-
99 Ga. App. 598, 109 S.E.2d 620 (2d Div. 1959).
2 NIL § 52; UCC § 3-302(1)(4).
a NIL § 25, 26, 27, 54; UCC § 3-303(a).
4 NIL §§ 28, 58; UCC § 3-306(b)(c).
6 NIL § 57; UCC § 3-305.
6 Freeman v. Exchange Bank, 87 Ga. 45, 13 S.E. 160 (1891); Fourth Nat'l Bank v.
Mayer, 89 Ga. 108, 14 S.E. 891 (1892).
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